London equity dealers routinely use two trading systems to trade with one another.
I. Introduction
In a dealer market, there are typically several di®erent ways that dealers can manage their inventory positions. Dealers can move their bid-ask quotes to attract customer order°o w. This strategy does not always work to the dealer's advantage when a substantial fraction of customer order°ow is preferenced.
2 Alternatively, dealers can manage their positions by trading directly with competing dealers, as discussed in Reiss and Werner (1998) Multiple interdealer trading systems are not just a feature of London's¯nancial markets. Nasdaq, for example, has a similar and yet di®erent mix of interdealer trading systems. In a recent paper, Smith (1999) shows that interdealer trading reached 15.8 percent of total dollar volume during 1998. Direct phone-negotiated interdealer trades represented 18.8 percent of total interdealer trading. Nasdaq dealers also have access to an electronic negotiation and trading system run by Nasdaq called SelectNet. This nonanonymous system competes with anonymous private Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) and crossing networks. 4 In 1998, SelectNet traded 53.2 percent of inter-2 Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan ( , 1999 show that in London: quote-improvements do not signi¯cantly increase customer order°ow; and roughly 70 percent of customer order°ow is preferenced.
3 The four IDBs were Cedar (Cantor Fitzgerald), First Equity, Garban, and Tullett & Tokyo. Beginning in 1995, London dealers also could use Tradepoint International. On October 20th, 1997, the London Stock Exchange began replacing quote-driven trading with a an order-driven trading system. Unfortunately, there is little public information on the impact of this change on interdealer trade.
4 Currently the o±cial ECNs are Reuter's Instinet (Real-Time Trading Service), Bloomberg's Tradebook, Datek Securities Corp's Island System, and Terra Nova Trading's Archipelago. Nasdaq traders may also use several crossing systems, e.g., ITG Inc's POSIT, and the Arizona Stock Exchange (AZX). For an extensive discussion, see the Securities and Exchange Commission's Concept Release (1997) .
dealer dollar volume on Nasdaq. Instinet and other sources represented the remaining 23.9 percent of interdealer dollar volume in 1998.
In this paper, we examine why London dealers use both direct and limit order markets to trade with one another. Our purpose is to follow up our earlier study (Reiss and Werner (1998) ) in which we concluded that interdealer trading systems primarily allow dealers to share inventory risk. While risk-sharing can explain the demand for interdealer trade, it does not explain why dealers would desire more than one system. There are four key di®erences between the two main systems in London that seem to in°uence dealers' choice of where to conduct interdealer trades. First, the systems di®er in the degree of anonymity they o®er. Direct IMM trades are nonanonymous while brokered IDB trades are completely anonymous. Second, they di®er in their exclusivity. Dealers trade along side customers in the direct market while IDB trading exclusively involves dealers. Third, direct IMM trades are based on public quotes while brokered IDB trades are based on limit orders. Fourth, dealers in the direct market must honor all direct IMM trades up to a regulated minimum quote size, while participation in limit-order systems is voluntary and the minimum size is small relative to the quote size.
We use a simple Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model to illustrate how di®erences in anonymity and the mix of informed versus uninformed customers and dealers can a®ect where dealers will trade. Absent di®erence in anonymity, we show that IDB trading only will occur if there is less adverse selection among dealers than customers. If we in addition follow Pagano and Roell (1992) and assume that there is a positive probability that an informed dealer will be detected in the non-anonymous IMM market, but not in the IDB market, we¯nd that the extent of adverse selection among dealers has to be smaller than without di®erences in anonymity for IDB trading to take place.
The third and fourth di®erences we noted above also potentially can explain why dealers might prefer IMM to IDB trading. Saporta (1997) develops a model of interdealer trading in which the fact that IMM trading is quote-based while IDB systems employ limit-orders plays a key role in determining which system is viable at a particular point in time. In her model, prices in limit-order based systems are more sensitive to asymmetric information than prices in systems with quote-based competition. Her model therefore makes much the same prediction as the Glosten and Milgom model: in equilibrium dealers will tend to use quote-based IMM (limit-order based IDB) trades when there is a high (low) level of asymmetric information.
Even though these models emphasize separate features of IMM and IDB trades, they both lead to the conclusion that asymmetric information should play a key role in determining where dealers will trade. In this paper, we use 1991 data for a sample of 25 FTSE-100 stocks to ask whether asymmetric information among dealers can explain the pattern of IDB and IMM trading. In particular, we explore four implications of the models. First, following the Glosten and Milgrom model, if informed dealers are more likely to use IMM trades, then we would expect to see a greater price impact of these trades relative to IDB trades. Second, the model also predicts that we should see more IDB trading when there is relatively more adverse selection among customers than dealers. To examine this prediction, we ask whether relatively more IDB trading takes place when spreads in the public market are wide. Third, if IMM trades are more likely to be informed, we would expect them to take place at worse prices than IDB trades. Finally, given the two systems coexist, and yet IMM trades are more likely to be informed, it must be the case that the execution costs and subsequent price impacts of these two types of trades balance so that hitting dealers are indi®erent between them.
Overall, our evidence supports the implication of both models that asymmetric information plays a role in dealers' choice of interdealer trading system. We¯nd that IMM trades have greater price impact and also are o®ered no price improvement. Moreover, the price impact of IMM trades is greatest when the initiating dealer requests to trade the maximum amount guaranteed at the public quotes. We also¯nd that there is a balance between execution costs and price impact for both initiating and posting dealers.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the London interdealer trading systems and outlines factors that might a®ect the choice of interdealer trade type. Section III presents the empirical evidence on the execution costs of IDB and IMM trades. Section IV attempts to measure the asymmetric information in dealers' trades, as measured by the subsequent price impacts of IDB and IMM trades. In Section V, we bring these two margins { price improvements and price impacts { together to examine trading revenues around IDB and IMM trades. Section VI concludes.
II. Why Is There More than One Interdealer Trading System?
In this section we describe the di®erent ways London dealers trade with one another and discuss features of interdealer trading systems that might a®ect dealers' choice of where to conduct interdealer trades. We analyze the importance of these various factors using two di®erent strands of the market microstructure literanture. The models we rely on for our hypotheses make speci¯c predictions about what types of trades that will occur in which interdealer trading system.
The most straight forward way for a London dealer to manage his inventory position is to negotiate a trade directly with another dealer based on that dealer's posted quotes.
Negotiations take place over the phone, and usually follow a set protocol. By custom, the initiating dealer identi¯es himself and reveals whether or not he is trading on his own account. In the course of the phone conversation, the posting dealer may also be able to infer some information about the hitting dealer's motives for trade. Whatever the hitting dealer's motives may be, the posting dealer must honor his posted quotes for trades up to a security's Normal Market Size (NMS).
5 If the requested trade exceeds one NMS, the posting dealer may o®er worse prices for the additional volume and can even refuse to take the additional volume altogether.
The minimum quote size for FTSE-100 stocks was regulated during our sample period. Each dealer had to post at least one Normal Market Size (NMS). One NMS is roughly equivalent to 2.5 percent of average daily volume during the most recent quarter. For rules regarding interdealer trading, see Alcock (1991) p. 113 6 It might seem that an obvious response to this rule would be for the initiating dealer to split his trades. Two things work against this. First, the receiving dealer almost always asks \whether there is more behind this." While the initiating dealer can lie, this cannot be done too many times without losing credibility and earning a bad reputation. Second, by phoning, the initiating dealer has already signaled to the receiving dealers (perhaps ambiguously) that he is in a bind and is unwilling to wait for customer order°ow.
A second, and equally popular, form of interdealer trade is to use the services of one of four interdealer brokers (IDBs). Each IDB runs an electronic limit-order book that operates in parallel with the dealer market. Access to these limit order books is restricted.
Only dealers in a security can see or use the IDB screens for that security. Dealers also are not permitted to share the information in these books with others. Each interdealer broker's book supplies a dealer with information on that book's best limit order prices to buy and sell, and the volumes o®ered at those prices. The dealers use these systems either to \post" limit orders or \hit" (i.e., consume) posted limit orders. The IDBs act as clearing agents, taking great care to keep the identities of the counterparties secret.
The IDBs pro¯t from this arrangement by charging the \hitter" a fee.
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For two competing trading systems to coexist, it must either be the case that prices are the same or that each system o®ers di®erent combinations of attributes that are not directly related to price. There are four signi¯cant di®erences between IDB and IMM trading that might qualify as important distinguishing attributes. First, IMM trading is nonanonymous while IDB trading is anonymous. Second, IMM trading is linked to dealers' public quotes while IDB trading is based on°exible limit orders. Third, (IMM) quotes are available to customers as well as to dealers while IDB trading is restricted to dealers. Finally, while dealers are obliged to post quotes, participation in IDB trading is voluntary and liquidity in IDB systmes might therefore at times be sparse.
We know of no single model that can simultaneously explain how these di®erences a®ect where dealers would choose to trade. We therefore derive our hypotheses by exploring the implications of two di®erent strands of the market microstructure literature.
The¯rst model follows Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and allows for anonymity along the lines suggested by Roell (1990) . The second is based on the interdealer trading model by Saporta (1997) . In both models, adverse selection plays an important role.
7 The hitter is charged with a¯ve basis points fee that is capped at 0.25 pence per share.
II. A. The Role of Anonymity
We begin with Roell's (1990) Glosten (1989) . Alternatively, the dealer who took the public order can pay a fee and post a demand/supply schedule with an IDB. In equilibrium, if the dealer who took the public trade uses the IDB, so will the competing dealers. Hence, in this case all dealers compete in demand schedules as in Kyle (1989) . By assumption, the opportunities for risk sharing are greater in the IDB market.
Saporta derives two key predictions from her model. First, she predicts that quotedriven (IDB) markets are more likely to be used (i.e., have greater liquidity), the greater 9 Other models of interdealer trading include: Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan (1996) , Vogler (1997) , Werner (1997) , and Viswanathan and Wang (1998) . the number of market makers. The reason for this is that increases in dealer competition tends to°atten dealers' price schedules and increase the potential bene¯ts from risk sharing. Similar e®ects do not occur in the direct (IMM) market because trading is bilateral (and thus ine±cient). Second, for a given number of market makers her model predicts that when the dealer taking the customer trade receives more private information, the dealer tends to favor trade in the direct (IMM) market. The reason for this is somewhat subtle. In response to an increase in private information, the less informed dealers widen their quotes in the direct market and they submit smaller market orders in the brokered market. Although, these changes reduce the attractiveness of both markets, they have the greatest impact in the brokered market because dealers behave more strategically there.
To summarize, both the sequential trading model and Saporta's model predict that dealers will only use IDB systems if the IDB prices are within the public quotes. Additionally, since public quotes re°ect adverse selection among customers and dealers, IDB trading is more likely to take place when public market spreads are wide. That is, when the degree of adverse selection in customer order°ow is relatively high. Finally, IDB systems will be used primarily when there is relatively little asymmetric information among dealers.
In the next two sections, we analyze these hypotheses about prices and adverse selection risk in the two markets using 1991 data from the London Stock Exchange. Our tests proceed in two parts. In the next section we document the execution costs associated with these two types of trades, taking the public quotes as a baseline. The results of this section show that IDB trades have lower spread costs (even when IDB fees are taken into account). While this result partially supports the adverse selection models, it raises the obvious question of why not all of the interdealer trade migrates to the IDB systems.
The following section answers this question by comparing the price impact of IMM versus IDB trades.
III. Price Improvements for Interdealer Trades
This section explores whether there is a di®erence between the price improvements dealers obtain for IMM versus IDB trades. Both our models suggest that we could see IDB trades transacting within the best bid and o®er of the public market.
Our study uses data obtained from the London Stock Exchange on all trades and all dealers' price quotations on London's SEAQ market in 1991.
10 Because these data come from settlement records, they contain a broker identi¯er and indicate whether they were done for a customer or the broker's own account. We identify IMM trades in the obvious way (two dealers trading with each other on their own accounts). We can identify IDB trades because the interdealer brokers have separate identi¯ers. We also use quote data from the public market to estimate price improvements relative to the market inside spread. Unfortunately, we do not have access to information on limit orders posted (but not yet executed) on IDB systems.
11 To keep what we report manageable, we use a 1991 sample of 25 FTSE-100 stocks from Reiss and Werner (1998) . alternatively have bought shares at the public market quotes, i.e., the best ask. The poster's price improvement is therefore the horizontal distance between the limit order price and the best ask. Consider now a dealer who \hits" the buy limit order. This dealer could alternatively have sold shares at the best bid. When he hits the limit order, he receives price improvement equal to the di®erence between the limit order price, net of the IDB's fee, and the best bid. Similar logic can be used to calculate the bene¯ts attached to limit orders to sell.
To measure the price improvement to the dealers and the IDB, we must know not just who was the buyer and the seller, but also who was the poster and who was the hitter. Additionally, we need to observe the IDB fee. Fortunately, our transaction data allow us to infer this information. Appendix B describes the algorithm we use to identify the dealer who initially posted the order. Note that we do not use the mid-point of the public market quotes to classify IDB counterparts as posters or hitters. For IMM trades, however, we have to resort to the mid-quotes to classify the liquidity provider and liquidity consumer. As in Lee and Ready (1991) , we identify the dealer receiving the phone call as the buyer (seller) if the trade price is closer to the bid (ask). If the trade price is at the mid-point, we classify the buyer as the liquidity provider. While the latter rule is somewhat arbitrary, it has virtually no e®ect on our results since IMM trades at the mid-point of the quotes are extremely rare. Table I reports the price improvement to posters and hitters in interdealer trades.
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From the¯rst two lines of Table I , we see that hitters of posted IDB limit orders received a median price improvement of about one-third of the public spread. The balance of the spread goes to the poster of the limit order. By contrast, a dealer who phones (\hits") a competing dealer in the public market receives a median discount of zero.
Thus, on the face of the aggregate numbers it appears that IDB trades take place at more favorable prices on average. The medians also do not appear to di®er by whether the interdealer trade was smaller or larger than the Exchange mandated minimum quote size (one NMS). A somewhat surprising result in Table I is that the median and mean discounts do not seem to vary signi¯cantly with the size of the trade. This¯nding di®ers from the size discounts seen in customer trades (Reiss and Werner (1995) ). It suggests that dealers do not systematically charge each other a premium for taking more than the mandated minimum quote size.
comparing Nasdaq's public quotes with bids and o®ers displayed on Instinet and SelectNet (SEC (1997) p. 27-78). Moreover, the new order-handling rules that came into e®ect on January 20, 1997, among other things, require dealers to re°ect orders that they post in ECNs also in their public quotes. Consequently, additional evidence that electronic orderbooks when active have prices that are \better" than public quotes can be found by comparing the public quotes before and after the new order-handling rules came into e®ect. This exercise was performed by Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1998) whō nd that publicly quoted spreads fell by between 4 cents (initial average spread under 30 cents) and 21 cents (initial average spread above 30 cents) following the rule change.
15 It is possible that this result arises from cross-sectional di®erences in patterns of IDB and IMM trading rather than di®erences over time for a particular stock.
IV. Price Impact of Interdealer Trades
In the previous section we saw that IDB trades received greater price discounts than direct IMM trades. This¯nding is consistent with the adverse selection among dealers emphasized in the two models, but it is only a weak test. To provide a more discriminating test of the models' predictions, we need to look for evidence of adverse selection. Unfortunately, it is not possible to know when dealers had superior information (or what that information was). We can, however, look at the market's subsequent reaction to interdealer trades as an indirect measure of the amount of asymmetric information. Our thinking is as follows. Suppose a dealer has obtained information that the price of a stock is likely to fall because of pending news. If his information is accurate, we expect him to sell shares (possibly short). Moreover, we expect the price at which he sells to be higher than the price level after the information has become public. In other words, we should see a negative price impact of the interdealer trade. Further, because our models suggest we should see more adverse selection among dealers in the direct market, we expect to see stronger price reactions following IMM trades.
We use two approaches to study the price impact. First, we follow the literature and estimate price impacts based on other trades surrounding each interdealer trade. One important departure, which we believe is a substantial improvement, is that we only compare buyer (seller)-initiated prices to nearby buyer(seller)-initiated trade prices. We do this to avoid contaminating the results with bid-ask bounce movements (See, e.g., Board and Sutcli®e (1995) , Reiss and Werner (1999) , and Koski and Michaely (1998) ).
Our second approach addresses possible unevennesses in the temporal spacing of trades by estimating price impact based on dealers' adjustments of quotes at¯xed time intervals surrounding each interdealer trade.
IV. A. Assessing Impact From Surrounding Trades
To gauge the price impact of interdealer trades from surrounding trades we proceed as follows. For each of interdealer trade, we estimated the average price movement surrounding the trades using a standard event study methodology. 16 We distinguish events by whether they were buyer-initiated trades (buys) and seller-initiated trades (sells). 17 For each interdealer buy (sell), we record the prices of (up to) ten buys (sells)
surrounding that trade provided they occurred the same day. It is important to note that this process compares buy prices with buy prices and sell prices with sell prices.
We label the interdealer trade of interest as trade 0. The ten trades before are labelled trades -11 to -1 and the ten trades after are labelled trades 1 to 10. 
We compute abnormal returns using the market model, where:
i;t is the stock's beta as estimated quarterly by Risk Measurement Service (RMS) and R M i;t is the quote mid-point based return on the FTSE-100 index between t and t ¡ 1 calculated from the intraday quote data. We favor reporting median abnormal returns since these are less sensitive to outliers. Results based on mean abnormal returns are not qualitatively di®erent from those reported here. We cumulate the abnormal returns for buyer-and seller-initiated IDB and IMM trades as follows:
Figures 2a and 2b show the median cumulative abnormal returns surrounding IDB and IMM buys and IDB and IMM sells respectively. Tables II and III provide the The previous literature on the price impact of trades has focused on large blocks.
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The presumption is that large trades tend to be associated with more information. When we break our sample of interdealer trades into size groups in Tables II and III, however, we do not¯nd that large interdealer trades are associated with larger price impacts.
For IDB trades, the price impact does not vary much with trade size. By contrast, for IMM trading the medium size (one NMS) trades are associated with the largest price impact. (Recall one NMS is the mandated quote size.) These are the trades where we would expect the receiving dealer to exercise the most discretion in limiting his exposure to informed trades. This result is akin to the \stealth trading" hypothesis proposed by Barclay and Warner (1986) . To gain some sense of how the price impact of these one NMS interdealer trades compare to what we would see for customer trades, we have graphed cumulative abnormal returns for one NMS customer, IDB, and IMM trades in Figures   20 See, e.g., Keim and Madhavan (1996) and references therein.
3a and 3b. These¯gures show that there is more information leakage prior to one-NMS IMM trades than IDB or customer trades, and that the cumulative price impact of one NMS IMM trades is several times larger than that of either IDB or customer trades of the same size.
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The¯gures also reveal that interdealer buys both have larger leakage prior to the trade and more substantial permanent price impact than the sample of interdealer sells. Similar di®erences between buys and sells have been found in many studies of the price impact of block trades for U.S. data and in one recent study by Gemmill (1996) for London data. Saar (1998) develops a model that provides a good explanation for why customer initiated block buys have a larger permanent price impact than customer initiated block sells. The story hinges on an unwillingness (or inability) of traders to take short positions.
Unfortunately, this story is less suited for explaining the asymmetry in price impacts of interdealer trades. London dealers have no problem taking extensive short positions (Reiss and Werner (1998) ), and short selling (stock loans) is inexpensive. It is possible that the asymmetry we observe is related to customer block trades that might have motivated the interdealer trades in the¯rst place. We explore this further in Section IV.
C.
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that trades placed in IDB systems have much less information content than trades negotiated with competing dealers. The evidence thus supports the sorting mechanism emphasized by our models of interdealer trading. The fact that the price reaction following one NMS IMM trades is so much stronger than that following IMM trades of other sizes lends further support to our hypotheses.
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In results not reported, we also¯nd that the total price impact of one NMS IMM trades is several times larger than the price impact of large customer trades (exceeding three NMS). Note that also one NMS customer trades take place at discounts relative to adjacent trades in the same direction! This is true also for large customer trades in London as discussed in Werner (1995, 1999) .
IV. B. Assessing Impact From Surrounding Quotes
Most of the literature takes trade time as the relevant period for gauging the price impact of \events." While trade counts capture the idea that market participants learn only when trades occur, in dealer markets participants also observe quote information.
An additional problem with trade prices in dealer markets is that they re°ect the bargaining power of trade counterparts, i.e., there are regular patterns of selective priceimprovements relative to posted quotes (Reiss and Werner (1995) ). To see whether these di®erences might matter for our analysis, we also examined the price impact of interdealer trades as gauged from the movement of best bid and ask quotes surrounding the interdealer trades.
To measure the impact of interdealer trades on dealers' quotes, we proceed as follows.
We examine the quotes e®ective for all trades during a day on which an interdealer trade occurs. To limit calculations, we restrict ourselves to 150 trades on each side of the event-trade if more than 150 trades occurred before or after the interdealer trade (that day). To condense the information in these quotes, we retain the e®ective market quotes of the last trade in 15-minute intervals ranging from up to three hours before to three hours after the interdealer trade (\the event"). Finally, we record the quotes for the last trade in each of the¯rst three 15-minute intervals of the day following the event trade.
To make the quotations comparable across stocks, we compute quoted prices (bids and asks) relative to the quotes' mid-points at the time of the interdealer trade. 22 There is also a noticeable narrowing of the spread immediately preceeding an IMM trade. For example, the sharp bid-price increase starts at -15 while the ask-price does not move sharply until after the typical IMM buy. One possible explanation for the spread narrowing is that the buying dealer is raising his bid to attract customer order°o w.
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The prices for the following day also tell us that the price impacts are permanent. 22 Corroborating evidence was reported in Reiss and Werner (1997) . We¯nd that about 16 percent of IMM trades (by value) occur less than one minute after a change in the public best bid and o®er, compared to 8.7 percent for IDB trades. Moreover, 32.7 percent of all IMM trades are followed within one minute by a change in the public best bid and o®er, compared to 10.8 percent of all IDB trades.
23 In future work we plan to investigate this possibility.
IV. C. The Potential Price Impact of Other Trades
A generic problem with the standard event-study methodology used in the previous section is that it fails to control for other things that might have happened during the event window. For example, in our prior work we noted how interdealer trades of- The results in Table VI suggest that not only the interdealer trade itself, but the clustering of interdealer (and other types of trades) can a®ect market prices. While it is 24 We limit the de¯nition of impact to trades +1 to +5 since we have complete data for all trades in our data set up to trade +5.
beyond the scope of this paper, these¯ndings suggest that it is important to consider order splitting when studying the price impact of trades.
V. Pro¯tability of Interdealer Trading for Hitters and Posters
The prior two sections have shown that there are systematic di®erences in price improvements and price impacts between two equally popular types of interdealer trades.
An obvious next step is to ask whether the di®erences in execution costs price out the adverse selection risks for both the hitter and the poster. The evidence presented so far clearly suggests that the initiating dealer (the hitter) bene¯ts on average from both IDB and IMM trades. The question then is does this come at the expense of posting dealers?
We measure the bene¯ts from interdealer trades by imagining that dealers adopt a buy (sell) strategy for a¯xed time period. While this measure has obvious drawbacks, it nevertheless provides some idea of the capital gains or losses dealers could capture.
Our speci¯c measure of trading revenue is that the dealer keeps a long (short) position for a¯xed time window and then closes out the position at the market ask (bid). This particular de¯nition thus imagines that dealers revenues accrue from the way they split the public spread.
25 In computing the trading revenues for posting dealers in IDB trades, we also account for the IDB fee (paid by the hitter). Some of the gain to hitters, however, may re°ect the bene¯ts of private information.
The key comparisons in Table VII in Reiss and Werner (1998) and the way adverse selection is hypothesized to a®ect the choice of interdealer trading venue in our theoretical models.
VI. Conclusions
Dealer markets, such as the London Stock Exchange and Nasdaq, have several different interdealer trading systems. In London, there are two major, and equally popular ways competing dealers can trade with each other. These trading systems di®er along several key dimensions, which appear to facilitate di®erent types of interdealer trades.
Speci¯cally, London's IDBs are viable only when the degree of adverse selection among dealers is low.
We draw this conclusion based on three empirical¯ndings. First, we¯nd that IDB trades on average obtain a price improvement of roughly one-third of the touch, while direct IMM trades on average receive no price improvement. If both trading systems were available at all times, obviously a hitting dealer would choose to use the IDB. Thus, there must be underlying factors that dictate when the alternative trading systems (IDBs) are available. Our second empirical¯nding suggests one such factor. We¯nd that the price impact of direct nonanonymous quote-based (IMM) trades is on average several times larger than the price impact of anonymous limit-order based IDB trades of the same size. We interpret the large average price impact following IMM trades as evidence that dealers in the IMM market have more private information. In other words, the dealer is buying from (selling to) a competitor based on quotes when he has information that the stock price is likely to rise (fall). These two empirical results taken together suggest that dealers resort to more expensive direct IMM trades when adverse selection among dealers is high. Of course, dealers might also choose IMM trades simply because quotes are more attractive. That could happen if public quotes re°ect the adverse selection among customers as well as dealers and the extent of adverse selection among customers is low. Our third empirical¯nding supports this prediction. The results presented in this paper suggest several interesting avenues for further research. The most obvious extension is to model the process that leads to an interdealer (or sequence of interdealer) trade(s). By observing events such as large block customer trades, we can study dealer layo® strategies. What our results above suggest is that the price impact of a block customer trade will be correlated with the strategy that the dealer uses to lay o® the block. While the dealer's strategy and the decision to accept the block are obviously joint decisions, our results in this paper suggest new directions for understanding how information is transmitted in dealer markets.
Appendix A
How screening of dealers for information is likely to impact IMM and IDB trading can be understood by a simple example based on Pagano and Roell (1992) . Consider an asset that with probability one half takes on the value V L and with probability one half takes on the value V H . Let V ¤ denote the expected value of the asset. Risk neutral dealers acting competitively will post quotes or limit orders for a¯xed trade size that re°ect the conditional expected value of the asset as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) .
Suppose that d i (c i ) dealers (customers) are informed, i.e., they know whether the value of the asset is V L or V H , and d u (c u ) dealers (customers) are uninformed. Uninformed dealers and customers buy and sell with equal probability. The identity of a fractiono f informed dealers is revealed during the phone conversation in an IMM trade. When buying (selling), these identi¯ed informed dealers will be charged V H (o®ered V L ) per share for the asset. Suppose a fraction ®(¯) of informed (uninformed) dealers migrate to IDB trading. Note that customers have no choice of trading venue. Limit orders to sell posted in IDB systems, a IDB , and publicly posted quotes, a IMM , will then be
Bid prices are obviously symmetric.
An equilibrium entails an allocation of informed and uninformed dealers between IDB and IMM trading such that the prices in the IDB are no worse than those in direct IMM trading. Moreover, IDB prices cannot be worse than the IMM prices that would prevail if all dealers stayed in IMM trading. This is required for uninformed dealers to be willing to participate in IDB trading. For any given¯¤, the allocation of informed dealers to IDB systems will be min(1; ®(¯¤)) where ®(¯¤)¸0 has to satisfy the following condition
Intuitively, the equation above gives informed dealers' best response to the trading venue decision of uninformed dealers. It is easy to show that ±®=±¯> 0 and that (±®=±¸) < 0.
First, suppose that there is no probability of detection, i.e.,¸= 0. Then, there are two possible outcomes. If the fraction of informed dealers is greater than or equal to the fraction of informed customers,
, the equilibrium allocation of dealers to the IDB will simply re°ect the overall proportion of informed traders (customers and dealers). Multiple allocations of dealers can support the equilibrium, and they all have the feature that IDB and IMM prices are equated. If the fraction of informed dealers is instead smaller than the fraction of informed customers,
, the only equilibrium will have all dealers migrating to IDB trading, ® =¯= 1. Since adverse selection in this case is lower among dealers, IDB ask (bid) prices will be lower (higher) than IMM ask (bid) prices.
The intuition is similar for the case of a positive probability of detection, i.e.,¸> 0.
The di®erence is that informed dealers face prices¸V H + (1 ¡¸)a IM M > a IMM in IMM trading. Thus, informed dealers are more likely to want to migrate to IDB systems all else equal. However, a positive¸does not a®ect uninformed dealers on the margin so the equilibrium condition is still that IDB ask (bid) prices cannot exceed (fall short of) the IMM ask (bid) prices that would prevail if all dealers stayed in IMM trading. The nature of the equilibrium again depends on the fraction of informed dealers relative to the fraction of informed customers. If
there is no equilibrium with IDB trading, i.e., ® =¯= 0. If
then the equilibrium is unique and all dealers migrate to IDB systems, i.e., ® =¯= 1. Note if anonymity plays a role, i.e.,¸> 0, and there is IDB trading, IDB prices will be \better" than equilibrium IMM prices.
In sum, if IDB trading is viable it is because the adverse selection among dealers is relatively low. As a result, IDB prices are \better" than IMM prices. The better dealers are at detecting informed competitors, the less likely it is that there will be IDB trading.
The reason is that as more informed dealers are separated from the pool of traders in IMM trading, the public quotes improve and it is more di±cult to support an equilibrium where adverse selection costs are lower in IDB trading.
Appendix B
The London quotation data record quotations to the nearest second. The Exchange dates trades to the nearest minute. This of course leads to problems when matching trades with quotations. Moreover, some trade records have two or more di®erent time stamps. IDB trades raise special problems because IDB trades are recorded as two separate transactions. Fortunately, the two sides of an IDB transaction allow us to infer who was the hitter and who was the poster. We also can use the two records to infer the IDB fee. Our algorithm that identi¯es the hitter and poster exploits the fact that a posted limit order will have a \round" price while the hitter's price will include a fractional IDB fee. For example, if the seller record has a price of $3.560000 and the buyer record a price of $3.561500, then we classify the seller as the poster and the buyer as the hitter (paying a 5 basis point IDB fee). We exclude from our analysis less than two-hundred trades that we cannot classify.
Since an IDB trade is created from multiple records, we sometimes have multiple time stamps. When we have multiple time stamps, we¯rst attempt to match the IDB trade to the quotes at the time reported by the IDB. If the trade price is more than 25 basis points of price outside the touch for the IDB time stamp, we rematch the trade to the touch based on the most recent quote-change. We again check if the trade is more than 25 basis points of price outside the touch. If not, we use these quotes; if so, we continue checking whether the trade is \valid" at any of the other time stamps. If none of the alternative time stamps gives a better match, we calculate the gains compared to the touch for the time stamp reported by the IDB. As long as the price is not more than 200 basis points of price outside the touch, we retain these trades despite the fact that they are outside the touch.
Because IMM trades do not identify who is the poster and who is the hitter, we use Lee and Ready's (1991) Price improvements (PI) are defined as the difference between the best quote and the trade price a market maker obtains from trading through and IDB or with another market maker (IMM) as a percentage of the touch at the time of trade. We identify the IDB poster as the market maker that pays a "round" price. (See Appendix B) . The IDB poster's PI equals 100 times the price received (paid) minus the prevailing bid (ask) divided by the touch. The hitter's PI is similarly defined. The IDB's gain is the remaining percentage of the ask minus the bid. We identify the poster in an IMM trade as the buyer (seller) if the trade price is closer to the bid (ask). Normal Market Size (NMS) is the minimum required quote size. The table reports tabulations for touch values 1.0 through 7.0 pence only. As a result, the cumulative precentage of trades does not reach 100. We exclude 6 IDB trades because of classification problems and 20 (136) Abnormal returns, AR(t)=ln(P(t)/P(t-1))-b*(lnM(t)/M(t-1)), are calculated using the market model. It is based on quarterly updated betas, b, and the mid-quote FTSE-100 index as a proxy for the marke price, M(t). Cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(T) are the sum of abnormal returns AR(t) from t=-10 to t=T. The table reports the median gains for hitters and posters in interdealer trades. For a buyer initiated trade, the gains are calculated as 100 times the ask price (at which a dealer will be selling the long position) at a reference point after the trade minus the purchase price. For a seller initiated trade, the gains are calculated as 100 times the sale price minus the bid price (at which the dealer may cover the short position) at a reference point after the trade. We use four reference points: 1 hour; 2 hours; 3 hours after the trade; and the open quotes the next day. We also report Brown-Mood two-sample tests of medians for differences in the gains from IMM and IDB trading for hitter and poster respectively. 
